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The Origins and Impact of Votes for Third-Party Candidates:
A Case Study of the 1998
Minnesota Gubernatorial Election DEAN LACY and QUIN MONSON, OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY
We estimate a multinomial probit model of vote choice and turnout to examine the 1998 Minnesota gubernatorial election. Like supporters of recent third-party presidential candidates, voters who elected Jesse Ventura tended to be young, male, lower in education, liberal on social issues, and fiscally conservative. Ventura support was not due to a general dissatisfaction with U.S. government, but it was correlated with voter dissatisfaction with Minnesota state government. Ventura was the Condorcet winner in the election; Hubert H. Humphrey was the Condorcet loser. With Ventura out of the race, Norm Coleman would have beaten
Humphrey by approximately ten percentage points. Coleman voters overwhelmingly preferred Ventura to Humphrey, but Humphrey voters preferred Ventura to Coleman by a slim margin. Ventura's candidacy added seven percentage points to the turnout rate. Under full turnout, the vote shares of the candidates would not have changed significantly Strong third-party candidacies are becoming commonplace in U.S. national elections, particularly at the presidential level. In four of the eight presidential elections between 1968 and 1996, a third-party candidate won at least 5 percent of the popular vote. No other thirty-year period in U.S. history has witnessed such third-party performance.1 Ross Perot's popular vote of close to 20 percent in 1992 was the highest ever recorded by a third party candidate who had no prior political experience, and his nearly 9 percent of the popular vote in 1996
Farmer-Labor (DFL) candidate Hubert "Skip" Humphrey III. Coleman was the incumbent mayor of St. Paul. Humphrey, in addition to his well-known family, had served previously as Minnesota's Attorney General. Though, strictly speaking, Jesse Ventura's previous political experience as mayor of Brooklyn Park did not qualify him for the label of "political amateur" under one scholar's definition (see Canon 1990) , Ventura certainly fits under the banner of actor/athlete with his background in professional wrestling.
Ventura's pro-wrestling notoriety, his experience as mayor, and his job as radio talk show host combined to give him an instant presence in early pre-election polls. In Figure 1 we present a time-series of publicly available pre-election polling data throughout the campaign. Early polls showed Ventura with just over 10 percent of the electorate's support, which remained relatively static through the September 15 primary election until sometime in mid-October. At that point his stock began to rise among voters. A poll conducted by the Minneapolis Star Tribune in mid-October put him over the 20 percent mark for the first time and enabled Ventura to secure an important campaign loan. He steadily rose in the polls through Election Day, while support for Humphrey declined. In the final published poll, released the Sunday before the election, the Star Tribune proclaimed in a front page story that "... Hubert Humphrey III, Norm Coleman, and Jesse Ventura each has a real chance of claiming the governor's office on election day Tuesday" (Smith 1998) . Even though he never officially led in the preelection polls, the signal communicated to voters through the press was that Ventura was in a position possibly to win. In the close three-way race this significantly reduced the incentives to vote strategically. Third party candidates face a perpetual problem of losing their supporters to strategic voting: third party voters often defect to their second most preferred candidate in order to avoid electing their least preferred candidate. With his momentum in the polls and eventual victory, Ventura overcame the usual trend that "third-party support fades as the election approaches" (Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus 1996: 41) .
Several contextual factors aided Ventura's rise in the polls. First, Ventura enjoyed visibility and name recognition from his pro-wrestling and subsequent radio talk show days. His radio talk show had frequent political guests, particularly the 1996 Reform Party nominee for U.S. Senate. This gave him some limited exposure, as well as practice in turning his formidable charisma toward political topics. His experience speaking on political issues served him well in a series of much-publicized debates toward the end of the campaign. Another important feature of the campaign that aided Ventura was that both major party candidates had crowded and competitive primaries to work through before they could turn their focus to the general election. This was particularly true for the DFL primary, which featured five candidates, three of whom were sons of prominent political Minnesota is one of a few states that allows Election Day voter registration, a significant factor since, as Rosenstone and Wolfinger (1978: 22) point out, "Registration is often more difficult than voting." Furthermore, they show that the rule that most depresses turnout is the time between the registration closing date and the election. Turnout was very high compared to previous non-presidential years, and much of the increase can be attributed to first-time voters turning out in large numbers. The post-election report issued by the Minnesota Secretary of State confirms that turnout (computed as the number of voters divided by the voting age population) was 60 percent in 1998 compared to 53 percent in 1994, and 57 percent in 1990. In addition, 15 percent of voters registered to vote on Election Day in 1998, compared to 10 percent in 1994, and 11 percent in 1990 (Minnesota Secretary of State 2000) .
Minnesota is also one of several states with public funding for statewide campaigns. While the major party candidates obtained their public funding early in the election cycle based on each party's large vote share in previous elections, Ventura had to wait until after the election to receive his share. However, based on his strong showing in pre-election polls, he was able to secure a substantial loan using the expected public funding and an insurance policy taken out to protect against a sharp drop in his standings as collateral. The public funding provided the necessary resources for a last minute media barrage in the closing days of the campaign. Although his total expenditures were just over $600,000, and his opponents each spent more than $2 million (Frank and Wagner 1999: 23) , Ventura secured enough financing to purchase a significant amount of advertising late in the campaign and become visible just as voters were turning their attention to the general election. In sum, a unique set of circumstances, both within and outside of the control of the candidates, combined to allow Jesse Ventura to beat the obstacles facing most third-party candidates.2 DATA AND METHODOLOGY To assess the origins and impact of support for Jesse Ventura, we turn to data collected by the Minneapolis Star Tribune and the Voter News Service. The Star Tribune poll comprises three polls conducted in the closing days of the campaign.
Data collected on Wednesday, October 27th through Saturday, October 30th 2 There are several good analyses of the election. For more background on the election context see especially Beiler (1999) ; Daves (1999) ; Frank and Wagner (1999) ; Smith and Barkley (1998); and Von Sternberg (1998 Rosenstone and Wolfinger 1978; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980) . A limited number of theoretically interesting issue questions are available for inclusion in the model. Among them are two questions measuring the respondent's perception of whether the United States and Minnesota are on the "right track" or "wrong track." Responses to these questions tap whether support for Ventura is associated with general dissatisfaction with national politics (the "angry voter" hypothesis often mentioned as a predictor of Perot support) or state politics. A respondent's opinion on abortion is included not only to assess the impact of abortion on voter choice but also to represent a respondent's position on social issues more generally We estimate the impact of economic ideology on electoral behavior using the only relevant item on the survey: a respondent's assessment of Humphrey's ability to manage state taxes and social spending. While admittedly not an ideal indicator of economic ideology, no other questions about preferences on taxes, welfare spending, or the general size of state government appear on the survey justified on empirical grounds. Research on likelihood of voting models for pre-election surveys demonstrates that self-reported likelihood of voting is a strongly related to validated turnout (Monson 1998) .
We seek to include as many respondents in our sample as possible. As with any survey, on any given variable a certain level of item non-response exists. In response to the vote intention question, a very small number favor minor party candidates and are omitted from the analysis. Four variables present difficulty with item non-response: respondent's ideology (10 percent of respondents missing), opinions on abortion (8 percent missing), assessments of Humphrey's fiscal responsibility (14 percent missing), and respondent's income (14 percent missing). Respondents who have missing values on any one of these variable are typically non-voters and have missing values on several of the variables. We employ strategies for preserving observations that might otherwise be lost due to missing.
For ideology, we create a series of dummy variables for conservatives, liberals, moderates, and those who answer "Don't know ideology" or "Refused." The abortion question creates a scale of strongly agree to strongly disagree that abortion should be a woman's right, but the scale does not include a neutral point. We code missing values as the midpoint of the scale in order to capture our belief that someone who does not answer the question is probably indifferent or highly conflicted between pro-choice and pro-life positions. We employ a similar strategy with assessments of Humphrey's fiscal responsibility, coding "don't know" as a neutral point. For the income variable, we generate predicted incomes for respondents who did not answer the question. Regressing the incomes of respondents who answered the question on their gender, age, education, race, party identifi-
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Results from the MNP model using the Star Tribune pre-election survey data appear in Table 1 . The coefficients for Ventura have been normalized to zero. A negative coefficient indicates a higher probability of voting for Ventura compared to the choice in the column header, while a positive sign indicates a higher probability of choosing the candidate in the column header. Before turning to the substantive results, we note that the bottom of the table includes estimates of the error standard deviation for abstention, and the error correlations between three pairs of choices (see Appendix for details). Since all other error standard deviations in the model are fixed at 1 to achieve identification (an assumption we first tested), the 1.18 standard deviation for abstention indicates a slightly larger, though not statistically significant (compared to 1.0) standard deviation for the errors for abstention than for the choice of candidates. Two of the error correlations are statistically significant (Coleman-Humphrey and Coleman-Abstain). In order to identify the model and establish a baseline for comparison, we fix at 0 the error correlations between Ventura and all other choices. This is merely a normalization that does not affect the substantive results.
Not surprisingly, being a Republican increases one's probability of voting for Coleman while identifying as a Democrat increases one's probability of voting for Humphrey Also as expected, prior voters-those who were eligible and voted in 1994-are less likely to abstain in 1998 than to vote for Ventura.
The demographic variables paint an interesting picture of Ventura's supporters. Older and more educated respondents are more likely to vote for Coleman or Humphrey, or even to abstain, than to vote for Ventura. Higher income makes one more likely to vote for Ventura than to abstain, but income does nothing to distinguish support for Ventura from support for Humphrey or Coleman. Women are more likely to vote for Humphrey or Coleman or even to abstain than to vote for Ventura. Finally, residents of the Minneapolis/St.Paul area are more likely to vote for Ventura than for either Humphrey or Coleman, suggesting that Ventura could have polled even more votes by campaigning in the rest of the state.
Issue positions and ideology also play a clear role in predicting whether or not a person votes for Ventura. While many journalists and pundits have implied that Ventura's victory sprang from his personality and that his supporters were not issue-oriented, there is clearly an ideological and issue content to his support. Self-described liberals are more likely to vote for Ventura than for Coleman, and conservatives and people who do not answer the ideology question are more likely to abstain, compared to the baseline moderates. On issues, a pro-choice position on abortion increases the probability a person votes for Ventura over both Coleman and Humphrey Pro-choice respondents are also more likely to vote for Ventura than to abstain. People who believe Humphrey would be fiscally irresponsible are more likely to vote for Ventura than to abstain or vote for Humphrey As expected, Ventura's supporters are libertarian-leaning: liberal social issues, yet fiscally conservative. A person's assessment of whether Minnesota and the United States are "o the right track" clearly indicates that Ventura's electoral success was due to d satisfaction with Minnesota government rather than a reaction to national con tions. People who believe Minnesota is on the right track are more likely to v for the major-party candidates than for Ventura. But, believing that the U.S. is the right track has no effect on Ventura support. Ventura's vote did not arise fr generally "angry voters."
The substantive effects of the independent variables on the probability choosing Ventura can be seen more clearly in Table 2 , which presents the chan in the predicted probability of voting for Ventura given changes in the indepe ent variables. We calculate the baseline probability of choosing each of the fou alternatives for a person who has roughly the modal values on each of the ind pendent variables. The baseline is a 49-year old Independent, moderate, fema high school graduate with an annual household income of $40-50,000 per yea from Minneapolis/St. Paul, who voted in 1994, who is moderate on abortion believes Humphrey would be fiscally irresponsible, and who believes the U.S. a Minnesota are on the right track. The model predicts that such a voter has a probability of voting for Coleman, a .26 probability of voting for Humphrey, a .2 probability of voting for Ventura, and a .16 probability of abstaining.
Entries in the table represent the predicted probability of choosing each alternative when the variable in the row heading is changed while all ot believes Minnesota is on the wrong track. Also, con self-described liberal is most likely to vote for Ventura, as is a person who is prochoice on abortion. Finally, a person who did not vote in 1994 or who does not know his or her ideology is most likely to abstain. While the largest increases in the probability of supporting Coleman or Humphrey are due to party identification, the largest increases in the probability of supporting Ventura are due to being young or male.
Applying the MNP model to the VNS exit poll data provides a remarkably similar picture of Ventura's supporters. As shown in Table 3 In many respects Ventura's support in Minnesota in 1998 is similar to the electoral support of third-party presidential candidates since 1968. Lacy and Burden (1999, 2001) demonstrate that votes for George Wallace (1968 ), John Anderson (1980 ), and Ross Perot (1992 , 1996 were cast by white males and younger age groups (see also Alvarez and Nagler 1995, 1998 for analysis of the Perot candidacies). Excluding Wallace's voters, supporters of third-party candidates at the national level have also tended to be socially liberal yet fiscally conservative. Ventura's successful third-party candidacy appears to be part of a larger picture of young, male, libertarian-leaning voters abandoning the Democratic and Republican parties for third-party alternatives. We also suspect that Governor Angus King's vote in Maine and former Governor Lowell Weicker's vote in Connecticut emerged primarily from libertarian-leaning voters who were closer to Democrats on social issues and closer to Republicans on economic issues. We do not have data to verify our suspicion, but the general ideological and policy positions of King and Weicker are similar to those of Ventura. The common roots of voter support for third parties acro national elections and across time portray third-party challenges wedge between the Democratic and Republican Parties. Increasing between the major parties is opening a hole for third parties to e successfully. As the Republican Party has moved increasingly towa servatism at the state and national level, many potential Republica found third-party candidates appealing. Similarly, as the Democr promoted increased taxes and spending programs, fiscally conser have turned to third parties. It is not surprising that the successf gubernatorial candidacies in recent years have all originated in th Northeast, and Alaska, areas that are typically more liberal on soci the South, which has become the cradle for conservative Republica cess of third-party gubernatorial candidates is a model for presid dates, then future third-party challenges at the national level are li from libertarian-leaning moderate Republicans or Democrats.
VOTE-STEALING AND TURNOUT EFFECTS
The MNP results in Tables 1 and 3 provide a means to estimate the votestealing and turnout effects of Jesse Ventura. The vote-stealing effect of a thirdparty candidate is the extent to which that candidate draws votes disproportionately from one major party candidate. We do not use the term "vote-stealing" pejoratively. A common concern in races with a third-party is whether the thirdparty candidate draws votes from one major party candidate more than the other, causing a reversal in the election outcome. In 1980 In , 1992 In , and 1996 , the third party presidential candidates did not change the outcome of the election. In 2000, however, Ralph Nader's candidacy drew disproportionately from potential Gore supporters, giving Bush a victory in the Electoral College (Lacy and Burden 2001) . In the 1998 Minnesota gubernatorial election, the term "vote-stealing" is misleading since the third party candidate won the election. In order to calculate whether Humphrey or Coleman would have won the election had Ventura not entered the race, one must also determine the percentage of Ventura's supporters who would not have voted if Ventura were not on the ballot. A candidate's turnout effect is then the percentage point increase in abstention if that candidate were not in the race (Lacy and Burden 1999) .
To calculate the outcome of the election with a choice removed from the set, we calculate each respondent's utility (P xi) for each of the four choices. A respondent's utility for Ventura is normalized to 0, thus all other utilities are either higher (positive) or lower (negative) than a respondent's utility for Ventura, producing a utility ranking of the choices for each respondent. These utilities can then be expressed as probabilities of choosing each alternative by using the estimates of s and r from the model as well as the estimated utilities to calculate the area under a trivariate normal distribution. For each respondent, we rescale these probabilities after Ventura is removed from the choice set by recalculating the area under a bivariate normal distribution for each person's remaining utilities. For further details, see Alvarez and Nagler (1995) or Lacy and Burden (1999, 2001) . Table 4 presents the calculated outcomes of the election with Ventura removed from the choice set. The first data column in the table represents the predicted vote intention of the respondents in the sample, along with a 95 percent confidence interval. These predicted vote shares are identical to the actual vote of the sample. The predicted election outcome deviates slightly from the actual outcome, due primarily to the surge in Ventura support in the final days of the campaign. Note, however, that the confidence intervals for these predicted vote shares demonstrate that the model predicts a close race. Once Ventura is removed from the election, the race is no longer close, as Norm Coleman beats Hubert Humphrey by a predicted margin of nearly 10 points. Coleman's vote share increases by nearly 20 percentage points, while Humphrey's increases by barely 10 percentage points.
The model also allows us to calculate the turnout effect of Jesse Ventura.
With Ventura out of the race, we see that 23 percent of the sample is predicted to abstain, compared to the 15.6 percent predicted to abstain with Ventura in the race. Ventura's turnout effect was 7.4 percentage points, which is nearly three times the national turnout effect of Ross Perot in the 1992 or 1996 presidential elections (Lacy and Burden 2001) . Since turnout in the 1998 gubernatorial Lacy and Burden (2001) .
The last three columns present similar calculations using the VNS exit poll data. Since the VNS exit poll contains no abstainers, we cannot calculate the abstention rate without Ventura in the race, nor can we calculate the outcome under full turnout. The sample vote shares are calculated from the area under a bivariate normal distribution. To predict the outcome without Ventura in the election, we remove Ventura as a choice and recalculate Humphrey's and Cole- A question in the VNS exit poll provides yet another perspective on the outcome of the race without Ventura. Voters were asked, "If these [Coleman and Humphrey] were the only two candidates for Governor on the ballot today, who would you have voted for?" The response rate to the question is low (1288 out of 1511 interviews), leaving us with some doubts about its accuracy. Among the voters who answered the question, 47.7 percent said they would have voted for Coleman, 39.3 for Humphrey, and 13 percent said they would not have voted. These percentages produce a two-party vote share of 54.8 percent for Coleman and 45.2 percent for Humphrey, within the range of our predictions using the MNP results from either the VNS exit poll or the Star Tribune poll. Among the Ventura voters who answered the question, 37.0 percent said they would have voted for Coleman, 28.9 for Humphrey, and 34 percent would have abstained. Among the Ventura voters who would have voted, the data show a two-party split of 56.1 percent Coleman and 43.9 percent Humphrey, identical to our calculations using the results from the VNS exit poll MNP model. With MNP results from two separate surveys showing the same outcome as the VNS question, we can conclude with confidence that Coleman would have won the election with Ventura out of the race.
These results settle a puzzle remaining from Figure 1 . Ventura's rise in the polls accompanies a decline for Humphrey, pointing to the conclusion that Ventura picked up more potential Humphrey votes than Coleman votes. This conclusion is incorrect. While late converts to Ventura may have come dispropor- Thus far we have focused on the outcome of the election without Ventura.
Equally interesting is the outcome of the election with either Humphrey or Coleman removed from the choice set. In a race with three or more candidates, the Condorcet winner is the candidate that beats all others in two-person contests.
Unfortunately, the VNS questionnaire did not ask respondents directly which candidate they would prefer in pairwise contests between Ventura and Coleman or Ventura and Humphrey.
We can use the results from the MNP model to calculate how Humphrey and Coleman voters would have behaved with their candidate removed from the choice set. This method is particularly useful in cases where survey data do not provide voters' preference rankings for candidates.6 Among Coleman voters in the Minneapolis Star Tribune sample, 45.8 percent would have voted for Ventura 6 Some researchers use feeling thermometer scores to construct preference rankings (Abramson et al. 1995) . Neither the VNS nor Star Tribune surveys included feeling thermometers. A pre-election poll conducted by Steve Frank at St. Cloud State University does include feeling thermometers. Constructing preference rankings from these thermometer scores reveals that a majority of likely voters 
THE EFFECT OF FULL TURNOUT ON ELECTION OUTCOMES
The MNP results also allow us to determine the election outcome under full turnout. A vast literature examines the effect of increased turnout on election outcomes, reaching the general conclusion that increased turnout would have little effect on the vote shares of the major parties in most national elections. However, few researchers have examined the effect of full turnout on the vote shares of third-party candidates. Lacy and Burden (2001) demonstrate that in the 1968, 1980, 1992, and 1996 presidential elections, the vote shares of all thirdparty candidates increase somewhat under full turnout, while the vote shares of Democratic candidates increase in all elections except 1980.
Our estimate of the 1998 Minnesota gubernatorial election outcome under full turnout is in the fourth data column of Table 4 . We find that full turnout would have had no significant effect on the outcome of the election. Ventura's vote share under full turnout is nearly identical to his sample vote share, while Coleman would add a statistically insignificant 1.6 percentage points to his vote share. Unlike recent third party candidates for president, Jesse Ventura would not have added to his vote share under full turnout.
CONCLUSIONS
Jesse Ventura is both exceptional and unexceptional as a third-party candidate and governor. His victory at first appeared "accidental" due to his last-minute
The Ventura vote has clear similarities to the Perot vote in 1992 and 1996, to the Anderson vote in 1980, and to the victories of third-party candidates in gubernatorial elections in Maine, Connecticut, and Alaska. Libertarian-leaning voters, younger voters, and men provided Ventura's base of electoral support. Ross Perot's supporters from the 1996 presidential election also voted for Ventura. Ventura appealed to them on issues and ideology as well as, from other accounts, personality. Like Perot and Anderson supporters, Ventura supporters are liberal on social issues, conservative on economic issues.
Not only was Ventura the plurality winner, he was also the Condorcet winner. He pulled votes disproportionately from Republican Norm Coleman, who would have won the race had Ventura not been on the ballot. Interestingly, Hubert Humphrey originally supported Ventura's presence in the gubernatorial debates, which now appears as a wise move if his purpose was to prevent the election of Coleman. Ventura was able to stage a last-minute surge in support as people who typically vote at low rates -the young, lower income, and less educated-were able to register on Election Day These voters tended to vote for Ventura, who accounted for at least a seven percentage point increase in voter turnout over what it would have been without his candidacy Compared to thirdparty candidates for President, Ventura's turnout effect is much larger, due primarily, we suspect, to Election Day registration and to the closeness of the race. Under full turnout, Ventura would still have won the governor's race, though he would not have added to his vote share as third-party presidential candidates typically would. Given the closeness of the race, Ventura avoided the pitfall of having his supporters defect for strategic reasons. Abstention may be included in a vote choice model in at least one of two ways. First, one might include turnout as a separate choice prior to vote choice. Vote choice is then modeled as conditional on the choice of turning out to vote in a nested model or selection model (Born 1990; Dubin and Rivers 1990; Herron 1998 ). Second, one might include abstention as one of the alternatives-along with each of the candidates-in a multinomial model, though the set of predictors for choosing abstention may be different from the set of predictors for choosing the candidates (Lacy and Burden 1999) . The argument for a nested or selection model with a turnout equation followed by a vote-choice equation is that the decision to turnout is causally prior to the decision for whom to vote, and the decision to turnout is fundamentally different from the decision for whom to vote. However, it is entirely plausible that a person decides which candidate she prefers before deciding whether her preference for that candidate is enough to motivate her to vote. This is especially true when a third-party candidate mobilizes many habitual abstainers who do not decide to vote until after they have decided to support the third-party candidate. Therefore, it is tenuous to assume that for all people the decision to vote is prior to the decision for whom to vote.
Since many of the predictors of candidate choice also predict turnout -education, income, gender, race, issue positions, satisfaction with government, to name a few-we prefer to include these in a multinomial model in which abstention is modeled as a choice similar to choosing among the candidates. The major drawback to including abstention in a multinomial model is that errors in predicting turnout may be correlated with the errors predicting candidate choice, but we avoid this problem by estimating a multinomial probit model that allows correlated errors.
The Multinomial Probit Model
MNP is a generalization of the traditional binary probit model used for dichotomous dependent variables (see Aldrich and Nelson 1984; Greene 2000; King 1989) , and the MNP model does not suffer from the "independence of irrelevant alternatives" restriction of MNL (see Alvarez and Nagler 1995, 1998; Lacy and Burden 1999) . In the case of estimating the effect of a third-party candidate on an election, the IIA restriction is substantively disturbing since it precludes the possibility that the absence of third-party candidate would have changed the relative probabilities of an individual's choosing the Democratic and Republican candidates. By allowing one to estimate the standard deviations and correlations in errors across choices, MNP avoids the IIA assumption that is hard-wired into multinomial logit. MNP is not the only model that relaxes the IIA assumption. Heteroskedastic extreme value (HEV), generalized maximum entropy, and random parameters logit, among others, also circumvent IIA. However, we have found MNP to be the most flexible and easiest to implement of these estimators, especially if one's primary concern is the removal of alternatives from the choice set.
Formally, the multinomial probit model is a random utility model in which the utility of individual i E (1,..., I} for alternativej E (1, ..., J) is: An alternative approach, discussed in Greene (2000: 872) , is to estimate a matrix of error correlations, R, and a diagonal matrix of error standard deviations, S = diag (ua, . oj, a_, 1) . The estimates of the error correlations (p) and standard deviations (&) are easily computed once identification is achieved by setting aj = 1, and one row of correlations contains only O's. Then, I = S'RS. In our models, the error standard deviation for the choice of Ventura is set to 1, and the error correlations between Ventura and all other choices are set to 0.
To estimate the MNP models, we used LIMDEP 7.0 with NLOGIT 1.1. We first estimated an independent probit model (Hausman and Wise 1978) in which all correlations are constrained to 0, the standard deviation on the error for Ventura support normalized to 1, and all other standard deviations are free. After finding a large standard deviation for abstention, we then estimated the model with the error standard deviation on abstention free, the error standard deviation on all other choices constrained to 1, and three error correlations free. We set to 0 the correlations between Ventura support and all other choices. This constraint is merely a normalization necessary to achieve identification.
In order to avoid "fragile identification" in the MNP model, the model must include restrictions in the matrix of parameters on the independent variables (Keane 1992). In each model estimated, we include a respondent's party identification as a variable affecting only the respondent's choice of the candidate from her own party relative to Ventura. We also include a variable indicating whether the respondent voted in the previous election, but the coefficient for this variable is estimated only for the choice of abstention relative to Ventura.
To simulate the results of the election with a choice removed, we read the 
